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Constituting Islamic Corporate Governance Theory through Islamic Moral Economy 





The financial crisis which led to economic turmoil has brought increased interest into the field 
of corporate governance as the latter seems to play a vital role that affects the economy due to 
its essence and determining the nature of the working mechanism of the corporate sector and 
the financial system as a whole. Corporate governance (CG) affects the behaviour of 
corporations in achieving its corporate goals thus its implications have effects on corporates’ 
performance.  
There has been an increased focus on CG as many claims that its pervasive adverse impact on 
the global financial system is one of the responsible factors that contributed to the financial 
failures. Suggesting that the board’s involvement is crucial to the corporations, this puts the 
board in the ‘hot seats’ as they are criticized for their inadequate level of engagement and inapt 
with regards to how they play their roles and responsibilities. Weaknesses of CG highlighted 
are not only on the ill-equipped board but also on senior management, corporate structure, 
framework, regulations, and the risk management aspects as well. Thus, work has been 
continuously carried out since the up fold of several crises as evidenced from the development 
of an enhanced framework, post-mortem, inquiries, and research papers to name a few, in order 
to improve CG. This posed an important question such as, should Islamic economics principles 
be applied in CG, perhaps the impact of future financial failures could be mitigated. However, 
establishing CG from the context of the Islamic moral economy (IME) may not seem feasible 
as the concept of Islamic economics (IE) is somewhat unverifiable as it is quite blurry in terms 
of its departure from its conventional counterpart. 
This paper insinuates that CG can probably be improved by applying IME principles from 
Islamic economics. Thus, it aims is to examine that the principles of Islamic Corporate 
Governance (ICG) can be developed from IE. However, the argument here is, it is hard to 
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encapsulate IE into ICG as these two subject matters have overarching principles thus have not 
been quite clear in terms of its demarcation. Furthermore, it is not easy to apply IME from IE 
itself as many claims that IE is not based on strong theoretical grounds. Theorists suggest that 
IE requires some empirical evidence to develop its own theories before the latter can be 
operationalized. However, it is envisaged that even if IME is conceptually proven, an element 
of enforcement is still required. Thus, this necessitated a strong political ground i.e. Islamic 
political economy to help with setting up laws and regulations to operationalize IE.   
The paper is divided into seven sections. While Section 2 discusses the conceptual definitions 
of CG, theories, and models, Section 3 discusses the principles of IME based on the tenets of 
IE. This section examines the axioms of IME to see whether the IE principles can be applied 
in CG and put into practice in the context of Islamic banks. Section 4 discusses how CG is 
conceptually derived from the perspective of IE of which the axioms of ICG are operationalized 
or put into practice within the domain of Islamic finance in general and IBs in particular. 
However, when IBF fails, this requires for some reflection through IME. Section 5 extends the 
ICG by adding the Shari’ah governance to the system. Section 6 presents a comparison between 
CG models. Section 7 concludes this paper with how ICG helps to strengthen Islamic finance 
through the manifestation of IBF through the Islamic political economy to apply IME.  
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS 
Ever since CG became prominent during the 1980s, definitions have emerged from many 
sources such as theorists, academics, economists, and etc. Inevitably, CG is observed from 
many perspectives. Thus, definitions have been very diverse, and any stereotypical patterns or 
conceptualizations of the definitions have been distinctive and are subject to the nature of 
reasoning in defining CG. This depends on the position and disciplinary background of the 
individual rendering the definition (Clarke, 2011), and a respective perspective, then, affects 
the particular way CG is applied. As Monks and Minow (1995) observe that CG definitions 
are often affected by the biases of those giving the definitions. Turnbull says that “The various 
views on corporate governance can also be related to different cultural contexts, intellectual 
backgrounds, and interests of scholars” stemming from “different academic disciplines.” Thus, 
“there is often little, or incomplete, integration between various disciplines” (Turnbull, 
1997:184) in providing a definition for CG, as in other social science related concepts. 
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Since definitions of CG often differ in various ways, simple generalisations of CG are difficult 
as inexhaustible definitions of CG exist in literature. One widely used definition is given by 
Cadbury (1992), which views CG as a system of control. In other words, Cadbury (1992) sees 
CG as trying to balance social and economic objectives while simultaneously being a structure 
promoting efficiency and accountability. Similarly, McRitchie (nd.) sees CG as both the 
structure and relationship which directs the corporation and determines its performance. Thus, 
the definitions take the board as the centre where its relationship to other primary participants 
is critical. This mirrors Cadbury’s definition, as CG is highly related to the board of directors. 
Likewise, Turnbull (1997) sees CG in the context of the board’s structure and function. From 
a broader perspective, Monks and Minow (1995) base their definition on relationships, 
focusing on corporations that do not perform well, as, to them, CG may be defined as the affairs 
of the whole company and not just the board. 
CG may be seen as a discipline that looks at how incentives affect management, specifically in 
the sense of financial performance. On a similar note, Wójcik (2002) views CG from an 
investment perspective. In the narrow sense, he agrees with Shleifer and Vishny (1997:738) 
who state that “corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves return on their investment”. In the broader sense, he agrees with 
O’Sullivan (2003:24), who views it as “concerned with the institutions that influence how 
business corporations allocate resources and returns. Specifically, a system of corporate 
governance shapes who makes investment decisions in corporations, what types of investments 
they make, and how returns from investments are distributed”. 
In further exploring the concept, Okabe (2004) views CG from two perspectives. First, he 
views CG as a framework that allows shareholders to supervise management. He calls this a 
‘finance approach’, as it is the corporate fund providers’ authority; or an ‘agency view’, since 
it regards managers as agents who manage the company for shareholders. This is similar to 
Wójcik’s (2002) narrow definition of CG. Alternatively, Okabe (2004) relates the behaviour 
of corporations to CG as a relationship in which competing interests are elaborated upon by 
stakeholders. He regards this later view as a “stakeholder view” as he believes that firms with 
the structure of authority, responsibility, and interaction among them belong to all stakeholders.  
Similar to previous definitions, Monks and Minow (1995) define CG through an administrative 
viewpoint when he perceives CG as being how companies are directed. He sees good 
governance as essential to corporate success and sustainable economic growth. In this 
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definition, a corporation exists as a structure allowing parties to collaborate and contribute 
capital to benefit others. According to him, research in CG is an interdisciplinary topic, which 
draws primarily from economics and law, and an understanding of business practices stemming 
from empirical studies in different national systems. 
Claessens (2006) defines CG as the relationship between the shareholders, directors, and 
management of a company, as defined by the corporate policy. Thus, CG is the set of 
obligations and decision-making structures that shape the complex set of constraints that 
determine the profits generated by the firm. 
In providing an integrated definition, Blair (1995) states that CG is about the arrangement in 
terms of legal, cultural, and institutional which spell out the corporations’ actions, the 
allocation of risks, and return. This coincides with the view that CG is a system of management. 
By adopting a consequential approach, Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) claim that CG structures 
are the result of political decisions.  
In providing an organisational perspective, Arrow (1974) views CG as starting with an 
organisation with common objectives. He regards each member as having different goals which 
are not necessarily in line with the organisation’s objectives. He views that not all corporate or 
external information is shared among members. 
Meanwhile, Cochran and Wartick (1988) conceptualise CG from two approaches. They view 
inconsistencies between practice and the ideal with regards to the management’s interactions 
with stakeholders. Beyond that, they also suggest that CG may be conceptualised through an 
understanding of CG’s fundamental issues, namely the separation of ownership and control as 
well as clarifying the difference between governance and management. This leads to associated 
theories of CG, as explored in the following section. 
3. ISLAMIC MORAL ECONOMY FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE  
Economic principles are not new to Islam and can be traced back to the revelation of the 
Qur’an, the holy book of Islam, to the Prophet Muhammad (Ayub, 2007). However, as far as 
literature is concerned, work on Islamic economics in the modern sense began as late as the 
1940s (Kahf, 2004). Historically, classical Muslim scholars, such as Ibn-Khaldun, Ibn 
Taimiyya, and Imam Ghazali among many others, had written extensively on economics and 
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finance related matters evidencing that the ‘great gap’ in economics postulated by Schumpeter 
did not exist (Ali and Thompson, 1999), as Muslim scholars with their original work filled that 
gap. Using such historical heritage, Muslim economists in the 20th century aimed to revive 
Islamic economics in a constructivist manner as an alternative system of understanding for the 
economic development of the Muslim world and beyond. In contemporary times, the 
development in Islamic economics is further initiated by the work of Mawdudi and Sadr, to 
name a few (Zaman and Asutay, 2009). 
As far as Islamic economics is concerned, rising interests in this area are not confined only to 
specific Muslim countries (like the Middle East, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Malaysia) but also 
the West (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The first commercial Islamic bank was established in 
1975, which paved the way for the emergence of developments in Islamic finance in the 
modern sense. From the 1990s until the early part of the 2000s, Islamic banks (IBs) began to 
grow but at a relatively slower pace. Not until late in the 1990s did IBs begin to show a 
significant presence. 
Being located within Islamic economics, the early discourse of Islamic finance articulates the 
essentialised principles of Islamic economics including profit-and-loss sharing while making 
reference to the social justice dimension (Asutay, 2012). Even though Islamic financial 
instruments in origin predate modern Islamic civilization, its re-emergence did not occur until 
after the post-colonial period, triggered by the quest for the meaning of ‘Islamic economic 
development’ that brings about IME (Asutay, 2012). Thus, as an important part and main 
institution of Islamic economics, the emergence of Islamic banking and finance (IBF) as 
institutions had to wait for the last quarter of the 20th century when developments in legal 
frameworks and regulations began to take place (Asutay, 2012).  
IME, and therefore IBs, emerged out of a need for fairness and freedom since Islam itself 
promoted social equality and economic fairness (Chapra, 1985). This resulted in the inception 
of IBs, objectives may be served which aimed to perform interest-free activities based upon 
the Shari’ah, halal transactions, and risk-sharing among investors, banks, and borrowers. 
Siddiqi (1989), for instance, regards Islamic economics as emphasising social justice. As an 
alternative to socialism and capitalism, Islamic economics is defined by the maqasid as-
shari’ah and benefits from fiqh structures in determining the nature of how Islamic economics 
is seen as opposed to the actual financialised nature of Islamic finance.  
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In his attempt to bring about the realisation of Islamic economics, Chapra (1992:4) stresses that 
the crucial test for an economic system lies not in the professed goals but in the realisation of 
the goals itself, in which he highlights the significance of world view to addressing the issues 
of the economic system. He sees the worldview as providing the function to support the 
foundation and strategy of the economic system before its goal can be attained, and he sees the 
economic questions as value-laden. 
Choudhury and Malik (1992) state that Islamic economics should play a part in building up the 
economic structure from Islamic sources of thought rather than being merely a discipline which 
studies the problems of the system as it was originally aimed as a discipline by which the 
foundation of ethical economics would be derived from the ideological viewpoint of the world 
as operating according to the will of God and his laws.  
Islamic economics relies on a worldview that needs to be filtered before being able to be 
effective (Chapra, 1992). Similarly, Nomani and Rahnema (1994:41) view Islamic economic 
realities as socially constructed, and thus on no account is any human endeavour value-free. 
Each action is produced and acted in a socially constructed manner which then justifies the 
difference in life’s undertakings (Asutay, 2007). 
3.1. Definition 
IME is defined by the conceptual foundations of Islamic economics through the axiomatic 
approach. IME or Islamic political economy is an Islamic economy with a systemic political 
economy in nature in which epistemology, institutions, and functions are all interlinked through 
a revealed knowledge.  
Formed by the philosophical foundations that themselves were built through the conceptual 
axiomatic foundation, Islamic economics or IME is a distinct discipline of economics with 
morals derived from the Islamic rationale embedded into it (Asutay, 2007). It is not a complete 
theory,  a simple application (Wilson, 2008), nor a substitute for mainstream economic theory 
but rather a way of approaching economics moralistically and rejecting the extremes of both 
capitalistic markets and command economies, and its utilitarian approach focuses on the 
maximisation of individual material satisfaction. 
Choudhury and Malik (1992) regard the Islamic political economy as a discipline that 
endeavours to study the relationships between policy, economics, and politics while also 
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aiming to integrate these with ethical and philosophical concerns. By integrating the 
epistemology of Islamic political economy into the wider Islamic economic structure and 
studying the theoretical structure of such endeavours, Choudhury (1999) views the Islamic 
political economy as a form of humanistic political economy which values humans as equals 
in all moral and ethical values. Meanwhile, Naqvi (1981) views Islamic economics as a system 
in which religious, economic, and social dimensions are all integrated to form an overall 
Islamic system. Still, within the context of an order, Asutay (2007) sees Islamic economics as 
the economic and financial activities outlined by Islamic principles and undertaken by 
institutions. He views it is as part of the religion dealing with production that is based on 
specific ideology with its own underpinnings.  
Broadly speaking, Asutay (2007) views Islamic economics as an ecological order, articulating 
the concept as a combination of working components that work within the Islamic ethical 
foundation. Whilst Islamic economics recognises the failures of the current system in 
promoting welfare, it may also be described as the summation of all Islam’s ethical 
propositions and encourages considering the welfare of others and may also help in regards to 
the voluntary movement of wealth from rich to poor for welfare purposes (Asutay, 2007).  
The Islamic political economy is sourced from Islamic sources of knowledge like the Al-Quran 
and Sunnah and its operationalisation has been derived from the premises of law and the 
realities of the market (Choudhury and Hoque, 2004). Choudhury and Hoque (2004) stress that 
with this base structure, essential elements relating to cooperation and economic stability are 
unlikely to manifest without there also being an ethical policy to support it. It is thus the 
axiomatic nature of this order which makes the formation of the Islamic political economy in 
operationalising the Shari’ah in the Islamic economy possible. 
Naqvi (1981) tries to analyse Islamic economics by combining the religious and social aspects 
with the economic dimension. This is in an attempt to develop a distinctive framework capable 
of solving economic problems uniquely. He believes that ethical guidelines as the dominant 
force in economics will allow its rules to be derived from Islamic principles and thus help 
establish clear economic guidelines for policymaking. In referring to the ethical foundations, 
Naqvi (2003) highlights how important religious morality is in achieving moralistic values due 
to how Islamic economics focuses on the behaviour of the individual human.  
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By the same token, Kahf (1989:43) is of the opinion that the ethical base provides the value 
system which governs all forms of Islamic economic activities. Ethics represents an integral 
part of the Shari’ah which helps provide the foundations for Islamic economic theory 
formulation (Choudhury and Malik, 1992). Through the ethical value, Islamic order provides 
the economic system in which the process is managed by a set of axioms and principles to 
achieve the economic objectives (Asutay, 2007:4). In summation, IME and the Islamic political 
economy is an Islamic economy with a systemic political economy in its nature in which 
epistemology, institutions, and behaviours are all interlinked through the revealed knowledge.  
3.2. The Structure of IME/IPE: The Axiomatic Framework  
IME is theoretically developed through strong foundational axioms based upon the al-Quran 
and Sunnah to create a world order with an authentic value system in the economy (Asutay, 
2007:167). In a socially constructed manner, IME aims to develop socially concerned and 
altruistically motivated individuals which can be defined as ‘homoislamicus’ as opposed to 
utility maximising individual ‘homoeconomicus’ modelled by neo-classical formulation (Ariff, 
1989; Asutay, 2012) 
In regards to IME’s axioms, Choudhury (1986) sees Islamic economics as being devised by 
humans but itself deriving primarily from independent sources, thus allowing it to be 
considered an alternative economic system. Choudhury (1999) regards Islamic economics as 
comprised of a few key principles: Tawhid and solidarity, felicity, distributive equity, as well 
as work and productivity which themselves are connected to IPE principles. It is a derivation 
of Islamic principles that allow the basis for an alternative economy based upon human welfare 
(Asutay, 2007).  
Islamic economics is made up of elements of din or religion commitment, and the right of the 
poor to the wealth of the rich. Naqvi (1981) stresses that secular and religious ethics should not 
contradict each other. Furthermore, Islamic economics acts as a mechanism that accentuates 
the naturalistic human desire to perform good deeds (Ahmad, 1976).  
Tawhid, as Islam’s foundation, carries tenets of the Islamic faith, which governs all 
fundamental domains of human faith and actions (Choudhury, 1993) and it is not merely an 
abstract religious doctrine or metaphysical concept as it enumerates a comprehensive ideology 
and philosophy of life (Khan, 2012:9). Khan (2012:9) looks at Tawhid from three different 
levels: individual, socio-cultural, and politico-economic. According to him, the individual level 
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is a revolutionary concept requiring the liberation of man from all desires and temptations, thus 
fully submitting oneself to God. 
On the socio-cultural level, he sees Tawhid as freeing man from the superimpositions of other 
men (Khan, 2012:9). Similarly, on the politico-economic level, Khan (2012:9) views Tawhid 
as seeking to liberate man from the political oppression and economic injustice of other men. 
Choudhury (1993:6) views the Quranic concept of Tawhid from three perspectives: 
psychological, moral, and social phenomena, which assume the principle of integration. 
Meanwhile, Asutay (2007) regards Tawhid as a vertical horizon to equality, in which everyone 
is equally close to God and where everyone is part of the whole system that allows economic 
activities to take place. 
The second axiom, ad’l, ensures that everyone receives what they deserve. It refers specifically 
to equilibrium. Mawdudi (2011), however, does not see it as referring to equality. Different 
from Tawhid, he says that everyone is only equal with regard to their claim to resources. 
However, for this to work, al ad’l (justice) must be supported by al-ihsan (Naqvi, 1981). This, 
together with Tawhid, helps create balance in the system by fulfilling the needs of people and 
society. This translates to a quality of life via the equitable distribution of wealth used for 
growth through the making of suitable policies.   
The third axiom, fard (mandatory action) means that everyone has obligations they must fulfill. 
This means that performing social good is meant to be a compulsory part of the religion rather 
than a voluntary action (Asutay, 2007). Thus, Islam fixes western concepts of individualism 
and capitalism by establishing concepts of fard ‘ala al-ain (individual responsibility) and fard 
‘ala al-kifayah (collective responsibility) (Naqvi, 1981).  
Ikhtiyar, another foundational axiom, is about the free-will of humans. This freedom is entirely 
unrestricted and up to the human’s discretion (Naqvi, 1994). It constitutes functional norms of 
economic activity in Islamic economic systems by actualising justice through its given 
individual freedoms (Asutay, 2007:7).  
Rububiyyah, another axiom of Islamic micro-foundations, refers to the development path of all 
things in either a personal, social, or natural context (Ariff, 1985), thus implying the integration 
of economic and social components. As an axiom, it suggests a divine arrangement for 
nourishment, sustenance, and directions to perfection (Ahmad, 1979:12), implying that 
everything has a ‘development’ path through which to grow. Thus, human beings, the 
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biological environment, and the social environment all have to develop through identified paths 
for sustenance and perfection (Asutay, 2007:8). 
Tazkiyah, an important moral axiom, is implicative of purified growth in trying to attain falah 
(a fortune in the world and the hereafter). It deals with growing towards perfection through the 
purification of attitudes and relationships (Ahmad, 1994). Tazkiyah operationalises the 
fundamental axioms and principles of the Islamic economic system. It is a result of the 
integration of Tawhid, ad’l, fard, and rububiyyah in order to make humans move towards self-
development and hence social and economic development (Asutay, 2007). 
Khilafah refers to how humans are accountable before God as human freedom and 
accountability are parts of khilafah (Naqvi, 1981). The role of humans as vicegerents on earth 
is considered the only reason for their worldly existence. Ahmad (1979) asserts that this axiom 
leads to such unique concepts as individual trusteeship alongside various rules of social 
organisation. This implies that the khilafah axiom includes notions of universal solidarity, 
sustainable consumption in pursuing a humble lifestyle, and freedom to lead a life (Asutay, 
2007:8). Asutay (2007) further explains that khilafah also relates to social accountability in 
terms of being aware of the consequences of the hereafter in all human actions.  
As a methodological paradigm, maqasid-al-shari’ah, a process-oriented concept meaning ‘the 
objective of Shari’ah’ with ‘the objective’ defined as human welfare, is achieved when 
institutions aim to maximise human welfare. It operationalises institutions in which there are 
Islamic economic systems by providing them with the working mechanism’s nature. In other 
words, maqasid-al-shari’ah is associated with shari’ah objectives, in the sense that it provides 
the structure for conducting economic activity. Furthermore, it is also a form of instruction and 
helps to draw the line between licit and illicit sources of income as defined by the Shari’ah. 
As mentioned by Asutay (2010), IME determines the economic value system’s structure, its 
foundational and operational dimensions, and how individual Muslims are to behave normally. 
Asutay (2010) regards IE as a discipline to interpret and solve economic problems using 
Islamic sources of knowledge. As mainstream economics was deemed inadequate in dealing 
with issues of uncertainty, the Islamic economic paradigm was created as a response to that 
(Asutay, 2007). 
IME can be defined as a system as it was developed based upon a system of understanding, 
which defines the foundational axioms, values and norms, methodology, operational 
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principles, and functional institutions. As such, IBFs should operate in such a framework so 
that IME’s aims and objectives may be served better. Thus, IBFs may be regarded as functional 
institutions if operating within the IME system. Thus, as a form of IME’s institutionalisation, 
IBFs must regulate the economy while being confined by the Islamic framework and the limits 
this framework entails, all of which are delineated in the CG framework (Asutay, 2010). 
4. ISLAMIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Being a structure, ICG encompasses the methodology with embedded moral values provided 
by Islamic principles to indirectly bring moral elements into the system. The previous section 
provides the rationale for Islamic corporate governance by laying down the micro 
religious/Islamic foundations. In other words, Islamic corporate governance, by definition, is 
developed from the Islamic norms, principles, and values. Such foundational principles, having 
implications on every aspect of life, by definition, hence, define the nature of corporate 
governance in Islam. Thus, Islamic corporate governance in its fundamental nature is not 
voluntary but dictated through the Islamic values by definition of Islamic ontology and 
epistemology, as explored in the following sections. 
The need to locate IBF in IME was hastened after a series of financial crises affected many 
economies. As crises are claimed to result from ethical deficiencies within the financial system 
and its related institutions (Kayed and Hassan, 2011), the ethical approach suggested by IME 
may prove useful in solving the problem. As some ethical deficiency-related failures have 
manifested themselves within corporate governance practices, it is thus important that an 
appropriate system of CG is created to provide an ethical outcome. Hence, IME’s foundational 
axioms can help to provide a structure for this undertaking. 
Islamic economics’ foundational axioms are aimed at creating a system of economics that is 
primarily human-focused (Asutay, 2007). The axioms define foundational principles and 
incorporate elements of social justice (Asutay, 2007:5). On this, Naqvi (1994:47) demonstrates 
that deducing economic statements from ethical axioms is a scientifically correct procedure. 
Thus, because CG sees a definition in Islamic law and because of the value and norms 
implications of IME, a distinct ICG is possible. The operational axioms are all summarised 
under the Islamic corporate governance structure which will help every entity and itself.  
Abdullah, Hanimon & Asutay, Mehmet (2021). “Constituting Islamic Corporate Governance Theory through 
Islamic Moral Economy”, in T. Azid, M. Mukhlisin, N. Akbar and M. Tahir (eds.), Monetary Policy, Islamic 
Finance, and Islamic Corporate Governance. London: Emerald. 
 12 
Therefore, a distinct ICG is possible by moving away from such axioms since they all refer to 
a particular aspect of creating an ICG with a distinct value system. To proceed with, some 
highlights on conceptual definitions of ICG may be deemed necessary. 
4.1. Conceptual Definition 
Corporate governance is about regulating the rights and responsibilities of parties through a 
legal system of enforcement. It is responsible for determining how parties behave and what 
their duties are and also that these duties are taken care of (Chapra, 2003). Despite its diverse 
definitions, Hassan (2010) views that the conceptual definition of CG does not differ much 
between the mainstream and Islamic. However, a standard definition of Islamic CG has yet to 
be achieved (Tapanjeh, 2009).  
On the other hand, as the above does not differ significantly from conventional CG, Ibrahim 
(2006) sees the distinctiveness of ICG as being in its structure, which requires validation to 
ensure all transactions are Shari’ah compliant. However, Tapanjeh (2009:556) says that ICG 
dimensions have a broader horizon and are unable to compartmentalise roles and 
responsibilities in which all actions and obligations fall under the jurisdiction of the divine law 
of Islam.  
Despite several underlying principles that support ICG, the following section attempts to 
rationalise CG from the perspective of the IME by referring to the foundational axioms. It is 
important to revisit the objectives of IME, within which ICG must be located, to understand 
the underlying principles of ICG, and the deficits which trigger factors underlining IBF issues. 
4.2. Rationale for Islamic Corporate Governance 
According to Asutay (2007), the above axioms are associated with the state of all human 
activities and are thus combined to produce harmony and justice in all human endeavours. 
Furthermore, these activities are undertaken by human agents given free will and thus they are 
also responsible for the consequences those activities may bring (Naqvi, 2003). In advocating 
the entirety of Islamic economics, Nomani and Rahnema (1994) uphold that all methodologies 
in Islamic economics are deduced via the Shari’ah, thus allowing for an element of clarity to 
be had as far as ethical values are concerned. 
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These axioms, hence, in addition to tawhid, adalah, and ihsan, represent the core foundations 
of ICG, as corporations should strive to bring about the realisation of these axioms’ 
consequences within the greater tawhidi framework, which, in turn, requires that all 
stakeholders be made to share the objective of achieving human well-being. 
In articulating the larger stakeholder nature of ICG, IME also assumes rububiyyah and tazkiyah 
as part of its axioms. While the former refers to developmental paths given by the creator to 
individuals, society, and the environment, the latter refers to the purification of stakeholder 
relationships and goals.  
ICG, being an IME model, refers to an ethical proposition and framework for Islamic banking. 
IME’s distinctive values are aimed at upholding ethical values in all human affairs inclusive of 
economic and financial matters that have consequences for organisational management, thus 
implying a distinct governance mechanism by essentialising the Quranic paradigm. 
4.3. Locating ICG within Moral and Political Economy of Islam  
Combining moral economics and the Islamic economic system via IBFs makes it an integral 
world system (Oshodi, 2010). Oshodi (2010:10) claims that by “allowing a combination of the 
moral economic core and the Islamic economic system via Islamic banking and finance would 
make this integral world system to reduce acts of immorality and corruption; influence better 
state and market coordination…”  to consistently reduce poverty level. Thus, it can be said that 
institutional, political vision, aims, and leadership is some elements that are present in CG. 
ICG, meanwhile, introduces a distinctly Islamic ideology via the IBF. 
In terms of the functionality or articulations of ethics and morality, ICG is similar to the 
conventional CG as it sees transparency and ethical concerns such as accountability and 
honesty as part of their key principles. However, with regards to structure and framework, ICG 
is distinct as it places the Islamic norms and values at the topmost, above the shareholders’ 
level, so that the ideals of human affairs may be achieved (Choudhury and Hoque, 2004). 
As such, a thorough and comprehensive framework named Islamic corporate governance is 
located in IPE to provide the norms for the organisation to achieve the aim of the IME. Whether 
this is achievable through IBF, it depends on whether IBFs are able to establish that legal, 
economic, social justice, and other such dimensions are to be incorporated into its 
methodological framework. Islamic finance theorists like Choudhury, Naqvi, Siddiqi, and 
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many others mention that the operational axioms of ‘Tawhid’, ‘adl’, ‘fard’, ‘rububiyyah’, 
‘tazkiyyah’, ‘khilafah’, and ‘maqasid al-Shari’ah’ are important elements in outlining the 
operationalising nature of IBF (Islamic Banking and Finance), which includes corporate 
governance. By upholding the concept of addin, these axioms are conceptualised and 
operationalized into the various dimensions of ICG: board; structure, committees and senior 
management; regulatory disclosure and transparency; audit; policies and procedures; support 
and operations as well as risk management dimensions. The proceeding section explains the 
principles of CG based on axioms as developed by Naqvi (1994) and Ariff (1983) as cited by 
Asutay (2007). There on ‘falah’ is achieved as described through the following:    
‘Tawhid’ when operationalised is reflected through the ‘board’ and ‘structure’ dimensions in 
ICG.  The vertical power between man and God can be translated into the power vested in the 
board in performing their mandate. As much as the board is highly empowered, they are liable 
for their action, as there is a supreme and utmost power beyond them. As for the horizontal 
power, this is operationalized between all levels in the structure. Mankind, regardless of their 
levels in the structure, they are all alike in the eyes of God which brings them vertically equal 
to God. As for their position between them, they should be horizontally equal in teams of rights. 
Through ‘Tawhid’, this assures equal rights to resources as Islam asserts that there is the poor 
right in the riches’ wealth. Furthermore, between the employee and employer, among the 
employees, stakeholders, shareholders, and society at large, there is no issue on oppression by 
the powerful on the weak as all mankind is at the same horizontal line to God. By 
conceptualising this axiom into ICG, the power vested in the board and shareholders is 
superseded by the divine power, at the utmost layer of the organisational structure that governs 
everything. As such, any decision making triggered regardless of from which level, will be in 
line with Shariah principles as such, decision made should be at the ‘discretion’ of God. In this 
manner, oppression between mankind is liberated as everyone is owned by God thus by no 
means that man is subjected to oppression of his own mankind.  
With ‘adl’, its conceptualisation into ICG reflects in the way the shareholder and the 
stakeholders are being treated in whatever manner for instance, in terms of profit and loss, 
charges, payments, and penalty, salary, and benefits. As Islam acknowledges rights and 
responsibilities, committees such as the remuneration and nomination as well as the senior 
management that work through the conceptualisation fare better in terms of taking care of the 
interest of the employees as no one will be deprived. Their actions are transparent, with 
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trustworthiness and honesty instilled in them which creates better working environments 
among the staff and management. The element of equilibrium can be operationalized. When 
‘adl’ is conceptualised in ICG through comprehensive policies and procedures, this ensures 
standardisation and uniformity as Islam instills fairness, justice, and transparency. This axiom, 
when conceptualised into ICG through risk management, also instils the elements of justice 
and fairness as Islam prohibits financial oppression or any kind of injustice and discrimination. 
The operationalization of ‘fard’ into ICG improves the ‘support and operations’ dimension in 
ICG as each person has his own commitment towards God, himself, the bank, society at large, 
etc. By instilling accountability and commitment, moral hazards do not exist. In fact, along this 
line, with the axiom ‘ikhtiyar’ imposed by Islam, Muslims are forbidden from giving up and, 
should not lament that everything has been decided by God as the element of freewill is also 
operationalized alongside the ‘fard’. 
As for ‘rububiyyah’, it is the element or concept of obligation to show respect to the divine 
arrangement. From the ‘board’ and ‘structure’ dimensions of ICG, this improves the working 
environment through clear reporting lines as ‘rububiyyah’ promotes concern for order and 
unity. From the perspective of the employee, the conceptualisation of ‘rububiyyah’, when 
operationalised into the support and operations dimension of ICG, creates a peaceful and 
harmonious working environment. As for the axiom of ‘ihsan’, when it is operationalized, this 
helps to maintain social and environmental concepts for nourishment and hence harmonious 
relations between different spheres of life. In addition, the axiom of ‘shura’ promotes 
discussions and feedback to ensure effective interactions thus employees and stakeholders are 
willing to adhere to rules and Muslims have to oblige to undertake their responsibilities and 
accountabilities through orders assigned to them. In the ICG context, ‘shura’ when 
contextualised in IBs ascertains fair and just decision-making in the Board meeting.   
‘Khilafah’ is conceptualised through the ethical criteria possessed by the ‘board’, ‘committee’, 
and ‘senior management’. They earn respect from staff and stakeholders due to their ethicality, 
honesty, knowledge, and fairness to name a few. As much as they are superior in terms of 
power, this does not entail taking advantage of the weak or allowing moral hazards to pursue 
one’s own interests. This axiom necessitates maintaining harmonious relationship among all 
as their aspect of decision making brings justice to everyone.  
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As for ‘Tazkiyah’, conceptualising this reflects in the good performance of banks with staff 
working in harmony. As this axiom sustains development, it uses the element of monitoring to 
ensure the right ways of doing things. Hence this is operationalized through the ‘audit 
dimension’ to ensure a check and balance to ascertain a harmonious environment as there 
should not be unethical and immoral actions between staff. In addition to the combination of 
tawhid, adl, fard and rububiyyah, there should also be transparency and standardization in 
terms of actions taken as everyone should be treated fairly regardless of their position.  
As mentioned, IME is developed through the formulation of Islamic economics in an attempt 
to develop its axiomatic foundations. These foundational axioms of IME are the articulation 
and operationalised aspects of maqasid al-Shari’ah which represent the ultimate aim within 
the tawhidi framework. This debate, hence, has consequences for ICG (Asutay, 2012).  
IME is socially constructed with emphasis given on the consequentialist nature of economic 
development and its substance. Thus, the anticipated result is a social welfare or social good 
with the embedded concept of adalah, justice, and haqq as the core objectives. 
As evidenced, a thorough and comprehensive framework named Islamic corporate governance 
is located in the IPE to function through the IBF as Islam provides the norms for the 
organisation to achieve the aims of the IME. The IBF thus needs to establish that legal, 
economic, social justice, and other such dimensions are to be incorporated into its 
methodological framework.  
4.4. Social Failure of IBF and ICG 
IBFs are supposed to offer ethical solutions to economic and financial dilemmas, something 
which is unique to ICG and should be capitalised upon by Islamic financial institutions 
(Asutay, 2012). As mentioned by Tapanjeh (2009:561), corporate governance in Islamic law 
provides and embodies much larger and vaster guidelines with encompassing duties and 
practices on how to deal with economic transactions with the moral conduct of a Muslim 
without even defining the modern world corporate governance as such Islamic laws impetus 
corporate governance in every individual action of Muslim up to the social environment. 
When IBs began to pick-up in the late 1990s, they were unable to function properly as they 
were developed without operational and methodological axioms, as research on IME was still 
under-developed. Consequently, IBs resorted to adopting the neoclassical economic approach, 
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resulting in convergence with mainstream banking. Based on recent developments, IBs are 
claimed to be neglecting the spiritual and ethical dimensions (Atzori and Mattei, 2009) by 
converging with mainstream economics, thus not fulfilling the institutional and policy 
requirements of IE (Asutay, 2012). Whilst analysing the paradigm shift from IMEs to IBs, 
Asutay (2012) observed divergence between IME’s aspirations and the IB’s realities. The 
divergence demonstrates ethical and social expectations that validate the claim of failure. 
Asutay (2007, 2012) has deliberated on this by reverting to the source of the IBs’ failure for a 
remedy to fix the shortcomings.  
Despite claims that IBs would be highly insulated from the financial crisis, the credibility of 
such statements was shaken since its position as an alternative banking system was found to be 
questionable following its failure to uphold the foundational aspects of Islamic economics 
(Asutay, 2007). As a matter of fact, Asutay (2007) sees IBs often become too occupied with 
profit maximisation and lose sight of their goals. However, since its adoption in the 1970s, IBs 
have yet to fully be in line with the foundational aspirations of IME.  
Islamic economics is deprived of its aspirations to create a world order, as IBs diverge from 
their initial aim to support moral economics. As mentioned by Asutay (2012), IME, which 
prioritises social good, is not simply about prohibiting certain activities like riba and gharar, 
but it is also about harmonising the various aspects of the economy. Thus, this manifests in 
IBF, an institutional tool for IME which is aimed at helping human economic development.  
CG is considered as one of the areas that the social failure of IBF is observed; as despite the 
fact that it is expected that IBF’s essentialise and operationalise around ICG values and notion, 
the observations indicate that they are rather share-holder oriented entities in their CG structure 
(Hassan, 2011), which implies that they only endogenise the interest of their shareholders with 
some charitable activities. However, ICG, which is an IME-based model, is commended for its 
endogenising efforts of larger stakeholders in CG as compared to the Anglo-Saxon share-
holders and stake-holder models. In fact, Hassan (2009) claims that the unique model of ICG 
actually fares much better than either Anglo-Saxon systems or the German and Japanese 
systems.  However, the experience shows that the Anglo-Saxon practice of CG is prevailing. 
With IME, IBs should focus on the interests of stakeholders instead, through the ICG 
framework, which places emphasis on ethical and moral value (Hassan, 2009). Considering 
that one of the main reasons for the recent global financial crisis is CG failures, the importance 
of ICG is essential for IBFs to embed in their structures and operation. 
Abdullah, Hanimon & Asutay, Mehmet (2021). “Constituting Islamic Corporate Governance Theory through 
Islamic Moral Economy”, in T. Azid, M. Mukhlisin, N. Akbar and M. Tahir (eds.), Monetary Policy, Islamic 
Finance, and Islamic Corporate Governance. London: Emerald. 
 18 
4.5. Theoretical Perspectives on Islamic Corporate Governance 
After rationalising and providing the distinctive nature of ICG, this section focuses on 
theoretical perspectives developed to explain ICG. 
Stakeholders theory and ICG 
Most of the Islamic scholars and analysts encountered so far agree with stakeholders theory 
due to the nature of its accountability towards the interests of a wider scope of constituents, i.e. 
that of stakeholders and shareholders and not just shareholders. To a certain extent, as far as 
stakeholders theory is concerned, its accountability with regards to the stakeholders’ roles and 
the protection of their rights can be extended in the context of ICG, as it looks at property rights 
and responsibilities not limited to human beings alone but encompassing all aspects of life.  
Chapra (2003) acknowledges that stakeholder theory may be able to work with the Islamic 
framework with regards to the emphasis on the equality of stakeholders (even if they do not 
own equity). In relation to the principle of property rights, his view is in line with the model 
proposed by Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) where he opines that the CG model in the Islamic 
economic system helps protect stakeholders also rather than just shareholders. Chapra (2003), 
however, doubts that an ICG model would be effective without Islamic elements within it, even 
if stakeholder theory covers much more area than shareholder theory.  
Stakeholders theory supports property rights and ensures contractual obligations are honoured 
as prescribed by Islam. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) agree that stakeholders theory aligns with 
ICG since they see the two as converging on the notion of protecting property rights. Firms in 
Islamic economic systems are seen as the hub of contracts, which are aimed at maximising 
returns and minimising transaction costs while also not performing any unethical activity to do 
so (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). In pursuit of this, firms are therefore required to adhere to 
implicit and explicit contracts without also imposing on the social order. Apart from property 
rights, stakeholder theory from the Islamic perspective also involves responsibilities. On this, 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) are of the view that stakeholder theory is not just a matter of taking 
care of the stakeholders’ rights but also on sustaining their rights. 
On the same note, Obaidullah (2004) agrees that stakeholders theory could see use I Islamic 
ethics since it also takes care of non-shareholders’ interests. This, however, demands CG to 
take care of the legislation and regulation in relation to issues of CG. On a slightly different 
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note, Obaidullah (2004) highlights how ownership works in Islam as it is comprised of two 
tiers: as belonging to God (first tier) and as belonging to man (second tier). Thus, Obaidullah 
(2004) agrees that the stakeholders' theory of the firm provides a clear outlining of what rights 
the various stakeholders have in firms in accordance with the Islamic state. 
Agency Theory and ICG 
As discussed earlier, agency problems have posed a lot of issues and conflicts in conventional 
CG. Supporting agency theory is difficult since many past efforts to overcome agency theory 
issues have led to a divergence from Shari’ah principles (Safieddine, 2009). As much as the 
contribution of stakeholder theory in the CG aspect is concerned, the basis of its application in 
ICG is questionable. 
There have not been many reviews on agency theory pertaining to corporate governance from 
the Islamic viewpoint. Nevertheless, Khan (1989) uses agency theory in comparing 
mudharabah and interest-based loans with respect to economic efficiency (Zarka, 2008:12). 
Interestingly, according to Zarka (2008:12), Khan’s work, which shows the benefit of agency 
theory through the use of control cost on Islamic contracts to compare between different 
contracts, has triggered several other studies (on the cost control cost) to delve deeper into. 
Zarka (2008:12) also brings up a point on the importance of information asymmetry between 
the parties of the contract with respect to the control of cost in agency theory.  
In its quest to take into account the interests of the whole stakeholders as opposed to just the 
profit maximisation objectives, stakeholder theory plays a part in upholding the principles of 
Tawhid through its emphasis on ethics as confined by the Shari’ah. Nonetheless, with respect 
to decision-making, there are still three fundamental questions (by whom, for whom, and with 
what resources) that need to be responded to by firms in an efficient manner (Azid et al., 
2007:17). In this regard, Azid et al. (2007:17) suggest that stewardship theory could be 
considered to address some of the Islamic CG issues as they state that the firm’s decision 
making is made in consideration of the spirit of partnership, taking into account the benefits of 
the firm. 
To date, there has not been much research developed on the conceptual formation of ICG with 
respect to its underlying theories1. This could be due to it having to rely on conventional 
 
1 Except for Choudhury’s (2004) philosophical view on Islamic corporate governance.  
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theories to support the framework. As far as IBs are concerned, its distinctiveness relates also 
to its Islamically determined CG structure which also includes Shari’ah governance in its 
hierarchical structure. 
5. SHARI’AH GOVERNANCE AS PART OF ISLAMIC CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Since the operation of IBs requires, their operation to comply with Shari’ah, Shari’ah 
governance through Shari’ah Boards, the nexus of ICG, is often used interchangeably with 
ICG. For the sake of this paper, the term Shari’ah governance refers to the functions of the 
Shari’ah board only, which is a key component of ICG.  
Shari’ah governance utilises the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB), a special board that 
ensures the operation of the IB is in accordance with the Shari’ah. Thus, if an institution desires 
to offer Islamic products, it must first appoint a Shari’ah board (or Shari’ah counsellor), and 
this has become the norm amongst IBs (Solé, 2007). The Shari’ah board is meant to be 
comprised of Islamic scholars who are knowledgeable in economics and it plays a role different 
to the mainboard.  
As Islamic finance is based on principles established by the Shari’ah and other jurisprudences 
or rulings (known as fatwa, issued by qualified Muslim scholars), it is always faced with 
complex issues, forcing involved institutions to seek the assistance of experts in interpreting 
them (Solé, 2007). In essence, the Shari’ah board is aimed at advising IFIs and monitoring 
transactions while also contributing to the creation of Shari’ah-compliant products (Ahmed, 
2011).  
Rammal and Parker (2010:7) list the functions of SSB as issuing formal legal opinions 
pertaining to Shari’ah, reviewing and revising transactions and dealings, holding a regular 
meeting to keep abreast with issues, preparing contracts, preparing studies and research in 
relation to zakat resources, carrying out technical reviews, and following up to ensure that 
controls are implemented as per Shari’ah requirements. 
Solé (2007) highlights that regulator’s rulings and decisions are supposed to be consistent with 
those of the Shari’ah boards of foreign supervisory agencies. It is widely agreed that Shari’ah 
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matters are always open to interpretation and it is widely mentioned it is difficult to standardise 
Islamic products due to this fact scholars in the field. Often, IBs are criticized for a lack of 
uniformity in the way the Shari’ah principles are applied and supervised (Rammal and Parker, 
2010:3). Having said that, IBs, or institutions offering Islamic products, must therefore utilise 
a Shari’ah Supervisory Board in order to make sure that their products comply with Islamic 
principles. However, different IBs often share the same scholars as there are not many scholars 
in the field. 
To a certain extent, the standardization of Shari’ah-compliant practices has actually increased 
the acceptance of Islamic products and IBs. Based on Ibrahim et al. (2009:233), IBs’ rapid 
growth is attributed to its value-oriented ethos, of which, based on his findings, more than 95% 
of the respondents felt that “compliance with Shari’ah law is a fundamental requirement in 
terms of ‘halal’ type of investment and investment structure”. This confirms the factor that the 
compliance attraction plays an important role in increasing the share of Shari’ah-compliant 
property investment, which then contributes highly to the growth of IBs.  
To achieve growth and stability, IBs must maintain customer confidence. By implementing 
good Shari’ah governance, it may be possible to mitigate issues of non-compliance with 
Islamic principles. 
6. COMPARING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS 
After discussing the various aspects of CG and ICG, this section presents a comparison table 
to depict the difference between the CG models applied throughout the countries. The details 
can be found in Table 1, which helps to locate the differences between various models and also 
helps to essentialise the ICG. 
Table 1: Comparing the Corporate Governance Models  
Aspects Anglo Saxon Model German Model2 Japanese Model Shariah Model3 
Theory 
orientation 
Shareholder Stakeholder  Stakeholder  Stakeholder  
Episteme Rationalism and 
rationality 




2 The German corporate governance model differs significantly from both the Anglo-US and the Japanese model, 
although some of its elements resemble the Japanese model.  
3 In an ideal situation 
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Aspects Anglo Saxon Model German Model2 Japanese Model Shariah Model3 
Country 
practicing 
UK, US, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand 
German, Austrian and etc.4.  Japan No-specific country -
depending on IB’s 
locality. 
Corporate goal Shareholding control 
managers in increasing 
profit 
Shareholding control managers 
in increasing profit 
Shareholding control 
managers in increasing 
profit. 
‘Shari’ah’ objective 
Nature  Management dominated  Controlling shareholder 
dominated  
 
Governed by Supervisory 







Structure One-tier Two-tier7: executive and 
supervisory responsibility 
separate 
Two-tier board. No tier-specific-








Boards’ size is smaller than 
Japan but bigger than the US 
and UK. 




Large boards11  
Many-sided i.e. main 
bank and financial 









The larger flow of 
information to the 
directors. 
The smaller flow of 
information to the supervisory 
board. 
 
Strong federal tradition15. 
Routine corporate 
actions requiring 



















4 Some elements of the model also apply in the Netherlands and Scandinavia.  France and Belgium have recently 
introduced some elements of the German model 
5 The supervisory board appoints and dismisses the management board, approves major management decisions; 
and advises the management board. It usually meets once a month. Executive and supervisory responsibilies  are 
separate. 
6 Management board is responsible for daily management of the company. The management board is composed 
solely of “insiders”, or executives. Supervisory board contains no insiders”, it is composed of labor/employee 
representatives and shareholder representatives. Management board is responsible for daily management of the 
company. The management board is composed solely of “insiders”, or executives.    
7 Composition of the Management Board (“Vorstand”) and Supervisory Board (“Aufsichtsrat”) in the German 
Model  
8 Board composition and representation is main concern. 
9 And cannot be changed by shareholders Supervisory board includes labour/employee representatives 
10 That is, executive managers, usually the heads of major divisions of the company and its central administrative 
body 
11 Generally larger than boards in the UK, the US and Germany. The average Japanese board contains 50 members.  
12 The main bank system and the keiretsu are two different, yet overlapping and complementary elements of the 
Japanese model. 
13 Shariah scholar act as the Shariah advisor (or some banks have a Shariah committee) that monitors and 
ensures compliance (Hassan, 2011). 
14 In the UK and US, a wide range of laws a well-developed legal framework defining the rights and 
responsibilities of three key 
15 Both federal and state (Laender) law influence corporate governance 
16 Such as: payment of dividends and allocation of reserves; election of directors; and appointment of auditors 
17 But not as stringent as in the US. Corporations are required to disclose a wide range of information in the annual 
report and/or agenda for the AGM 
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By a wide range of 
institutions.  
Strong relationship 
between a corporation and the 
main bank. 
A strong relationship 
between a corporation 










prohibited by antitrust 
legislation 
Banks are key shareholders. 
 
Banks develop strong 
relationships with corporations 
20. 
Relationships are prohibited by 
antitrust legislation. 
 
Investors not affiliated with a 
corporation21 
A strong relationship 
with a network of 







prohibited by antitrust 
legislation. 
Strong relationship 









(“insiders”) seldom sit 
on boards. 
 
Relying on a single bank - 
banks are key shareholders to 
obtain financing. 
 
German banks and corporations 
hold ownership of the equity 
market-dominant shareholders  
 
Neither banks nor corporations 
are key institutional investors23. 










Role of Stock 
Exchange 
Strong role in corporate 
finance  
Reduced   
The market for 
corporate control 
Hostile takeovers are the 
‘correction mechanism’ 
for management failure 
Takeovers restricted.   
Role of banks Banks play a minimal 
role in corporate 
ownership 
Important both in corporate 








Separation of ownership 
and control 
 
Legal liability for the 
acts of the corporation is 
avoided. 
Banks and corporations are 
major shareholders; dividends 




Share ownership of the 







Financial institutions and 
corporations firmly hold 
ownership of the equity 
market27.  
 
Dividends are less 
prioritised, as 
organisations are 




Depending on the 
jurisdiction of IB’s 
country of origin. 
Source: Adopted from Hassan (2011:4); Clarke and Chanlat (2009:146) 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
18 Sha’riah audit is accountable for compliance. Also corporations should apply  ethical codes of conduct as 
instruments of self-regulation (Sacarcelik, 2013). 
19 Have no voice in AGM. As a result, there are few truly independent directors, that is, directors representing 
outside. 
20 Due to overlapping roles and multiple services provided 
21 known as outside shareholders or “outsiders”; 
22 Including the well-developed securities market. 
23 The mandatory inclusion of labour/employee representatives on larger German supervisory boards further 
distinguishes the German model from both the Anglo-US and Japanese models.  
24 and develop strong relationships with corporations, due to overlapping roles and multiple services provided   
25 In contrast, outside shareholders represent a small constituency. “Outsiders” seldom sit on Japanese boards. 
26 Regulate the size and determine the composition of the supervisory board; they stipulate the number of members 
elected by labour/employees and the number elected by shareholders 
27 Shift during the postwar period has been away from individual ownership to institutional and corporate 
ownership. 
Abdullah, Hanimon & Asutay, Mehmet (2021). “Constituting Islamic Corporate Governance Theory through 
Islamic Moral Economy”, in T. Azid, M. Mukhlisin, N. Akbar and M. Tahir (eds.), Monetary Policy, Islamic 
Finance, and Islamic Corporate Governance. London: Emerald. 
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As discussed, CG systems in different countries are varied. As much as the differences between 
the conventional CG models are seen, the models of CG between the conventional and Islamic 
point of view is even more distinct in many aspects. The main criterion of ICG is that it is based 
on epistemology sourced from the Qur’an and Sunnah. Its substance brings insights of how 
Islam takes care of every aspect of life not only in economics, politics, and the financial sector 
but all other aspects of life too. Its consequence in the financial sector can be operationalised 
through IBs. Thus, in achieving its aims and objectives, ICG is being steered and navigated by 
Islamic principles and shaped in accordance with morals and ethics. 
In concluding the meaning of IME should be looked at beyond economics. It is generally 
viewed as an economic system embedded with ethics and moral values. Despite its various 
definitions, depending on which perspectives it is looked from, IME is a complete humanistic 
system that blends religion, economics, and social aspects to reach balance from many aspects 
such as politics, economics, society, and religion. It is to achieve equilibrium in order to form 
a unity by linking all the elements together as an integrated relationship, which deals with 
observations and interactions in addressing the many aspects of life. Such a paradigm 
inevitably has consequences for CG as well in shaping the relationship within an organisation.  
As explored in this chapter, the details of the IME do rationalise such a view in developing a 
particular notion and mechanism of CG in the form of ICG with distinct values, norms, and 
operational framework. 
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